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CUBA AS AN ALLIED REPUBLIC OF THE 
UNITED STATES.1 
BY THE EDITOR. 
J\ NY AMERICAN who has lived in the political atmosphere of 
fi this country during the last year, must know that the war 
with Spain was undertaken with the purest intentions; that what-
ever jingos and other advocates of war may have done, prior to the 
tragic fate of the Maine, they had comparatively little influence on 
the final decision. We may even say that the war was undertaken 
in spite of the declamations of yellow journalism. 
The declaration of President McKinley that our intention was 
to free Cuba, however undiplomatic it may have been, truly ex-
pressed the sentiment of the nation. It was undiplomatic, for it 
bound the hands of our government, and it pledged the United 
States to a definite policy towards Cuba, after its liberation from the 
Spanish yoke. This lack of diplomacy on our part is in one respect 
an honor to us, for it shows the naIvete with which we acted. We 
have so little experience in dealing with other nations, in consider-
ing all possible complications of' future emergencies, and guarding 
against intrigues, that we have remained children in diplomacy. 
The Spaniards are by far our superiors in diplomacy, and have 
thereby succeeded in securing for themselves the sympathies of 
Europe, with the exception of England, and in creating prejudices 
against us which have no foundation. President McKinley's dec-
laration was undiplomatic, because, in the first place, there was 
no necessity to inform the world what we would do, and, secondly, 
he could not foresee all the changes that might, and did, actually 
occur within a few months, among which the possibility of Euro-
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pean interference in American politics loomed up threateningly.' 
There are many Americans who deem the thought of a war with a 
European power, be it Germany, or France, or Italy, or Russia, a 
ridiculous absurdity. 
But it seems now plain that had not the American navy proved 
extraordinarily efficient, we might have been implicated in a Euro-
pean war, and the powers might have interceded as they did in 
Crete after the Graeco-Turkish war. The possibility of European 
interference renders our relation to Cuba very complicated. While 
the citizens of the United States wish nothing more than friendly 
commercial relations with Cuba and its inhabitants, while they 
have not the slightest intention of interfering with their internal 
affairs, or of ruling their country, and while, at the same time, it 
would be extremely unwise to attempt any meddlesome interfer-
ence with Cuba's home politics, we must recognise that the natural 
situation of Cuba, with its wonderful harbors, which are naturally 
fortified and easily defended, may become a threatening danger to 
the United States if any foreign power should seize them at a crit-
ical moment. Havana is a convenient base of naval operations, 
from which sudden and harassing sallies can be made upon the 
coast of the United States. The duty of watching them would em-
ploy an entire navy. It would thus tie up a number of our best 
and greatest ships in an eventual war and render them useless for 
aggressive operations. But that is not all. Some day the Nicaragua 
Canal, perhaps also the Panama Canal, will connect the two great-
est oceans of the world, and then the commercial and strategic im-
portance of Cuba will be of still more vital importance to the 
United States, because Cuban harbors afford a good basis to a 
squadron that attempt to blockade or attack either of these canals. 
For these reasons it would be a crime against the United 
States to allow the harbors of Cuba to remain in weak or in un-
friendly hands, which might enable hostile powers to entrench 
themselves there and gain a foothold for warlike operations against 
the United States. 
It was the moral duty of the German government to keep the 
fortresses of Metz and Strassburg, not for the sentimental argu-
ments frequently adduced in favor of annexation that these cities 
formerly belonged to Germany, but for the very obvious reason 
that these fortresses are the very doors of Germany, from which 
the French may invade Baden without being obliged first to seize 
any German stronghold. It cost the Germans a number of severe 
battles to conquer these positions, and their possession is in dis-
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pensable to German interests, for guarding the peace, and for the 
protection of the South German states. In the same way, we must 
consider the possibility of future wars, and of European interfer-
ence. We must be On our guard lest any power might at a critical 
moment take by force possession of the Panama or Nicaragua 
canal. We must forestall international complications, and keep 
these most important strategic points, upon the possession of which 
the fate of our nation and its future development depends. 
What, then, shall be done. in order to keep the pledge given at 
the outbreak of the war, and to be faithful to the just interests of 
the American people? In our opinion, there is but one solution of 
the problem, which is: Let Cuba be an independent republic, with 
an independent government, and leave her citizens free in the ar-
rangements of their home politics. But let the government of free 
Cuba be in inseparable alliance with the United States; let the 
United States be responsible for the defence of Cuba, and act as 
a direct protector in case of foreign complications with Cuba. If, 
for instance, a case should occur like the Liider case of Hayti, a 
foreign power should be obliged to press their demands through 
the United States, and not treat directly with Cuba. This relation-
ship would prevent the possible invasion of American territory by 
European powers, and would thus be of mutual benefit to Cuba and 
the United States. 
The freedom of Cuba with a full-fledged home government is 
perhaps an ideal that cannot be realised at once, and it is a matter 
of course that the United States should introduce the system of 
home government gradually by first administering the affairs of the 
country through officers appointed by our national government, in 
the same way, for instance, as the District of Columbia is governed 
directly by the United States government. The inhabitants of 
Cuba would, presumably, be quite satisfied with such an arrange-
ment, for while in the United States the administration of cities 
where everything is left to election leaves much to be desired and 
shows corruption in its ugliest forms, every administration which 
has been executed directly by the United States government has 
proved very efficient and satisfactory. The city of Washington 
is perhaps the best-governed city in the United States, and there 
is no one at Washington who shows any anxiety to have the system 
changed. 
While the home politics of Cuba should be left to the manage-
ment of the Cubans, the natural harbor defences of the island 
should be declared federal strongholds, to be held by the allied 
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forces of the United States and Cuba under the command of the 
President of the United States. 
What the final outcome of the fate of Cuba will be is still 
doubtful, but it seems that this is the sole solution of the problem. 
It leaves Cuba independent, and yet gives to the United States of 
America the possession of those strategic points which in the future 
history of the world will naturally and necessarily become of im-
portance to our country; and the Cubans will find it in their own 
interests that these points are held by the strong hands of the 
United States, in preference even to their own, because the possi-
bility of their being wrested from them by a sudden coup might be 
fatal to the interests of the government of free humanity in the 
western hemisphere. 
